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Abstract
In this paper we articulate how time and temporalities are involved in the making 
of living things. For these purposes, we draw on an instructive episode concerning 
Norfolk Horn sheep. We attend to historical debates over the nature of the breed, 
whether it is extinct or not, and whether presently living exemplars are faithful cop-
ies of those that came before. We argue that there are features to these debates that 
are important to understanding contemporary configurations of life, time, and the 
organism, especially as these are articulated within the field of synthetic biology. 
In particular, we highlight how organisms are configured within different material 
and semiotic assemblages that are always structured temporally. While we identify 
three distinct structures, namely the historical, phyletic, and molecular registers, 
we do not regard the list as exhaustive. We also highlight how these structures are 
related to the care and value invested in the organisms at issue. Finally, because we 
are interested ultimately in ways of producing time, our subject matter requires us to 
think about historiographical practice reflexively. This draws us into dialogue with 
other scholars interested in time, not just historians, but also philosophers and soci-
ologists, and into conversations with them about time as always multiple and never 
an inert background.
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Introduction
The Norfolk Horn Breeders’ Group (NHBG) aims to “advance awareness, promo-
tion, preservation and enhancement” of the ovine breed in its care. In a short histori-
cal sketch, the NHBG (2012) reports that the Norfolk Horn breed had been impor-
tant to the medieval worsted industry, as well as to the maintenance of four-course 
rotation across East Anglia, an agriculturally prosperous region in south-eastern 
England. From the late eighteenth century, however, as greater attention was paid to 
the improvement of livestock, renowned agricultural improvers dismissed the breed 
as worthless and promoted its replacement with the Southdown. The crossing of any 
remaining Norfolk Horn with the Southdown resulted ultimately in the creation of 
the Suffolk, which has proven invaluable to modern farming. As a result, the number 
of Norfolk Horn plummeted down to a single flock, which, in the early twentieth 
century, was placed under the care of the Animal Research Station at the University 
of Cambridge as the object of studies into the inheritance of an organic disorder said 
to characterize inbred animals. By the late 1960s, the Norfolk Horn was on the brink 
of extinction, but, according to the NHBG, the Rare Breed Survival Trust (RBST) 
has brought the Norfolk Horn back from the brink.
The narrative is compelling. At the same time, however, a recent history of sheep 
and the British landscape (Walling 2014) reports that:
Joe Henson …, Michael Rosenberg and Lawrence Alderson were founder 
members of the RBST and took the lead in re-creating a simulacrum of the 
Norfolk, the Norfolk Horn, from the cross-bred lambs out of the Suffolk. It is 
from these that the new Norfolk Horn is descended. This is not the same con-
temptible animal that Coke affected to despise, but a tamer version of the old 
indomitable breed (154–5) (emphasis added).
Walling is not the only author to question whether the original Norfolk Horn and 
its contemporary representatives are equally worthy and of the same breed, see for 
instance Wade-Martins (1993).
In the Norfolk Horn we find an organism and breed whose status as ancient or 
novel, natural or artificial, worthless or valuable, is uncertain. Bombarded as we 
presently are by claims to the novelty, productive potential, and economic value of 
the most disparate biological objects and systems, the Norfolk Horn becomes an 
ideal focus of attention. For the sake of brevity, our discussion of its importance 
emerges from a protracted discussion about genes, organisms, and the writing of 
history (Palladino 2003; Berry 2014a, b). One of us, in the course of their work 
on bio-heritage and the renewal of rural economies, discovered a number of pro-
vocative debates about rare breeds such as the Norfolk Horn.1 The other noted fea-
tures of these debates that echoed discussions of synthetic biology and its future 
development. While the resulting investigation of the resonance allows us to cast 
1 This paper was made possible by Palladino’s tenure of a fellowship to study the relationship between 
sheep, wool, rural regeneration and connectivity in British, Spanish and Italian uplands, and by Berry’s 
participation in a European Research Council project on engineering life.
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unexpected light on these latter discussions, the overall emerging understanding of 
the relationship between life, time, and the organism is important to the biological 
sciences more generally.
The proposed resonance between animal breeding and synthetic biology becomes 
particularly evident when we turn to the first issues of Ark, now the official organ 
of the RBST.2 In the very first issue, the editors reported that the Norfolk Horn no 
longer existed, but its blood-line had survived and this could serve to re-establish 
the breed. Two years later, the editors introduced a forum in which selected figures 
within the newly established RBST would discuss issues of interest to its mem-
bers. The first of these discussions was again dedicated to the Norfolk Horn, asking 
whether and how the investment of the resources required to re-establish the breed 
might be justified:
How can the Trust justify expending its resources on breeding-back pro-
grammes, such as the New Norfolk Horn project, when the final product can 
never be a pure breed and will only approximate in its characteristics to the 
original, but now extinct, breed? (Ark 1976, p. 54).
The responses elicited evoke diverse notions of originality.3
James Hindson, a veterinarian, sought to distinguish recreation and reconstruc-
tion, deeming the former impossible and the latter desirable, primarily because it 
was important to remember the Norfolk Horn and its contribution to the making 
of modern agriculture. Michael Rosenberg and Andrew Sheppy, two commercial 
breeders, operated with a different notion of originality. Specifically, Rosenberg 
responded by arguing that any distinction between recreation and reconstruction 
could only be qualitative. From a quantitative perspective, any categorical distinc-
tion was untenable because, as a result of outcrossing in the field and on the farm, no 
breed is ever completely and unambiguously differentiated from any other. Sheppy 
echoed Rosenberg, adding that the rarity of a breed referred to its contemporary 
numbers, not its history. From Sheppy and Rosenberg’s perspective, the Norfolk 
Horn was to be defined in relation to a genealogical lineage and what mattered most 
was the proper management of biological reproduction and its vagaries. Finally, 
Lawrence Alderson, scientific advisor to the RBST, observed that decisions in the 
matter discussed should be based on whether or not the attained animals would 
repay an imagined, future farmer’s attention.4 Furthermore, if what was desired was 
a sheep exhibiting the original breed’s distinctive features, these could be obtained 
2 For a history of the RBST, see Alderson and Porter (1994). The broader social context out of which the 
RBST emerged is examined very usefully in Evans and Yarwood (2000).
3 Determining who was involved in the debate is not easy. Andrew Sheppy, for example, was not one 
of the invited participants and intervened by writing a letter to the editors; see Sheppy (1976). Woods 
(2013) also suggests that Peter Jewell’s (1975) contemporaneous, more general case for the preservation 
of domestic livestock should be regarded as contributing to the discussion.
4 Alderson, who also owned and edited the journal, wrote under a pseudonym, George Hastings; inter-
view with Lawrence Alderson (on 8 March 2016). The creation of the forum in which the debate took 
place also served as a marketing device to attract readers’ attention to the issues covered in the new jour-
nal and the new enterprise that was the RBST.
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most readily by drawing on alternative and unrelated breeds, rather than committing 
to a program based on genealogical relationship. Here, originality was evacuated of 
all reference to historical processes and genealogical descent, and was understood 
instead as the match between contemporary exemplar and intended design.
The question of whether the Norfolk Horn is extinct or not is one that was, and 
still is, divisive, but the discussions on the pages of Ark suggest that the answers 
will depend on one’s definitions and starting assumptions about authenticity and 
artificiality. This understanding applies just as well with regard to the discussions 
about synthetic biology and its proposals to bring equally iconic animals back from 
extinction, and to the more general questions about the relationship between cop-
ies, originals, and simulacra which synthetic biology raises, as it sets out to trans-
form organisms into the wholly disciplined materials of engineering and industrial 
manufacture.5 In what follows we build on such resonance by first observing how 
the diverse views on the relationship between copies and original at stake in the 
debates over the Norfolk Horn would seem to entail three equally distinct temporal 
registers, which, for reasons we outline below, we will label historical, phyletic, and 
molecular. In so doing, we adopt and advance the notion that time is best understood 
as the product of social and cultural practices that also contribute to the moral and 
economic valuation of the objects involved. Secondly, there is a potential difficulty 
related to the organic nature of the objects on which we focus. Does it matter that the 
understanding of time which we advance rests on the construction of living rather 
than non-living things? If we were to take synthetic biology as our guide, our focus 
on living or once living organisms introduces no difference at all. For synthetic biol-
ogists, and for some of those who study them, the organism, like any other manufac-
tured material, is devoid of any intrinsic temporality and the aim of the enterprise 
is to overcome the “tyranny” of evolution (Endy, as quoted in Frow 2013, p. 443). 
By contrast, what we find while attending to the Norfolk Horn is something quite 
different. Not only are organisms clearly situated in time, but the temporal regis-
ters involved are multiple, binding the organism, life, and time in unexpectedly com-
plex ways. The registers’ mutually constitutive relationship to one another suggests 
that synthetic biology’s denial of time is part and parcel of the same phenomenon, 
the plurality of ways in which time contributes to the construction of relationships 
between life and the organism. We conclude therefore that the organism’s existence 
in time might then be best characterized as a plural form of existence, such that 
“biological time” must give way to “biological times.”
In sum, ours is a history of the present, intent on demonstrating why and how the 
multiple temporalities emerging from the Norfolk Horn story matter today. There 
may be a still more important payoff for the community of historians of biology. 
We are a community most at home writing, enriching, and exploring the histori-
cal register, here and there noting and exploring the phyletic and molecular, though 
ultimately in ways that result in making the historical more valuable and authentic. 
5 The literature on synthetic biology emerging from science and technology studies is extensive. Start-
ing points include Balmer et al. (2014), Ginsberg et al. (2014) and Scott et al. (2018). See also Campos 
(2010) and Fox Keller (2009) for two influential historical treatments.
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There is a disorientation that follows upon noticing the operation of temporal regis-
ters, one that we seek to cultivate. We hope that as soon as you have finished read-
ing, you will feel the need to rush out, stare at a sheep and repeatedly ask yourself 
“what is this now?”6
Concepts and Methods
In what follows, we articulate the features and functions of three temporal regis-
ters, registers being our preferred term for the temporal component of material and 
semiotic assemblages. We label the first of these historical because it focuses on the 
commemoration of the past, and the second phyletic because it is concerned with 
lines of descent. Borrowing Deleuzian terminology, we label the third and final reg-
ister molecular, to capture how entirely different phyla might be imagined if one 
were to focus on elementary parts, rather than organisms and lineages. As Deleuze 
and Guattari (1988) put it with regard to Geoffroy Sainte-Hilaire’s understanding of 
organic forms and their temporal organization,
Organic forms are … different from one another, as are organs, compound sub-
stances, and molecules. It is of little or no importance that Geoffroy chose ana-
tomical elements as the substantial units rather than protein and nucleic acid 
radicals. At any rate, he already invoked a whole interplay of molecules. The 
important thing is the principle of simultaneous unity and variety of the stra-
tum (46).
The molecular register, as we shall see, organizes things differently from either the 
historical or the phyletic. There will of course be other important readings of our 
terminology, but we wish to be clear that we are not presuming some all-embracing 
molecular science. In fact, the various biological enterprises that today operate at 
the molecular scale might make for very interesting sites in which to search for dif-
ferent temporal registers, no doubt beyond the three proposed here; see also (Marks 
2006).7
We draw particular attention to our registers’ following three features. First, 
and perhaps restating the obvious, the registers are more than one. Elements 
of such pluralism have already been advanced elsewhere. Thus, Shavit and 
6 One of our reviewers noted the resonance between our argument and Deleuzian perspectives on cop-
ies, originals, and simulacra, asking why we did not refer to Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (2004). 
As we explain below, we regard this as the kind of ontological purification that we wish to resist, not 
because we are sceptical about the accounts that sustain the argument, but because we see no need for 
any commitment to a differential ontology and so prefer agnosticism.
7 In an earlier draft we had called the register “phylogenetic,” knowing that some biologists and phi-
losophers might regard this as misappropriation. A very persuasive reviewer pointed out the variety of 
ways in which the term has been used in different branches of biological science, offering the examples 
of systematics and developmental biology, and that these uses often are inconsistent with the distinc-
tions we here build between temporal registers. We hope that “molecular” avoids these problems, without 
masking our intentions or overemphasizing the importance of substances such as DNA. We would like to 
thank this reviewer for their fulsome engagement with our argument.
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Griesemer (2009) have sought to examine whether and how ecologists are able 
to return to the same research site, much as we are interested in what it might 
mean to reproduce the same organism. In doing so, they characterize the multi-
ple conceptions of space at work in pivotal ecological practices and the problems 
that they generate for any understanding of biodiversity. An interesting difference 
between their argument and the one developed here is, however, that we do not 
aim to clarify the conceptions of time mobilized in the diverse contexts we exam-
ine. Rather than considering their role as guides in the clarification of epistemic 
practices, we emphasise a number of functions that these diverse conceptions of 
time fulfil, some of which might be called social or cultural, others epistemic, and 
aim to show how multiple temporalities are at work within the same organism. In 
this last respect, our approach is closer to those cultural geographers who have 
drawn attention to the many temporal registers that are involved in the construc-
tion of place; see (Crang 2001). Second, these registers do not exist independently 
of one another, but are instead involved in each other’s construction. To put the 
point simply, we argue that when our actors point to the historical significance of 
the Norfolk Horn, they also draw on phyletic and molecular understandings of the 
Norfolk Horn, even as they differentiate the three temporal configurations of the 
Norfolk Horn from one another. In so doing, we again echo Shavit and Griese-
mer’s own understanding, when they argue that “each mode of study inextricably 
figures in the other” (p. 275). Third, we show that it is the resulting complex rela-
tionship between the different registers that establishes the worth of the objects 
at issue. This may be of some importance not only to understanding the complex 
relationship between contemporary investments in rare breeds and place, but also 
to the more general investments of care for the lives of the organism (Colombino 
and Giaccaria 2015, 2016; Shukin 2009).
Having drawn on the debates over the Norfolk Horn to characterize our three 
registers, we will then bring the resulting understanding of time and the organism 
to bear on contemporary endeavours that are related very poignantly to the fate of 
the Norfolk Horn. Just as an earlier generation of breeders sought to advance their 
position by bringing the Norfolk Horn back from the verge of extinction, so today 
some synthetic biologists are advancing their position by claiming that they can, for 
instance, bring the famed wooly mammoth back to life (Church and Regis 2012; 
ETC Group 2013). Just as synthetic biologists derive power from undoing the work 
of historical time, so did those debating how to secure the Norfolk Horn’s continued 
existence. Just as the manipulation and capacity to reconstitute organisms outside 
the constraints of phyletic lineage today excites synthetic biologists and their audi-
ence, so too did such claims excite those invested in the power of breeding to trans-
form organisms. While the parallels are inescapable, however, ours is not a com-
parative exercise, not least because the label “synthetic biology” covers a multitude 
of very different and distinct research programmes and activities that makes for an 
unsuitable mirror for the very particular goal of reviving a breed. We argue instead 
that the play of temporal registers that is involved in debates over the nature of the 
Norfolk Horn helps us to understand how these synthetic biologists and other allied 
actors extract value from their work. It helps to understand how the process of creat-
ing value within synthetic biology involves the mobilisation of multiple temporal 
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configurations of the organism, even as it positions some organisms outside time; 
see also (Dussauge et al. 2015).
Methodologically, our mode of inquiry into the significance of the Norfolk Horn 
is genealogical (Foucault 1977). We have adopted this mode because we are inter-
ested in understanding the production of the present as the welding together of dis-
parate material and semiotic resources, particularly as they relate to temporal con-
figurations of the organism. In this context, relationships between the present and 
the past are so complex that we find ourselves not only returning to older discus-
sions regarding the role of the historian in reconstructing the past, but also asking 
what forms of life historians bring into the present through their reconstructions of 
past relations to organisms, either dead or alive; see (Lowenthal 1998, 2005). Clas-
sic texts such as Clarke and Fujimura’s The Right Tools for the Job (1992) call for 
closer, critical inspection of the kinds of organism that these accounts stabilise; see 
also (Latour 1986; Law 1986). We are drawn to the greater detachment that gene-
alogical method would seem to afford. Such attraction is also a response to those 
philosophers who have turned to the organism in order to overcome the limitations 
of existing, universalising schemes, including the historical. Primarily we have 
in mind Heidegger and Deleuze’s different responses to Nietzsche’s iconoclastic 
embrace of evolutionary process and its evacuation of the natural world of all mean-
ing (Buchanan 2008; Storey 2015). While Heidegger sought to ground the recon-
struction of philosophy in the mortality of the organism, particularly that of the 
human organism, the latter sought to ground the same reconstruction by reframing 
the understanding of evolutionary process as an endless production of difference, a 
reframing in which the organism and its mortality ceased to enjoy any privilege. As 
Deleuze and Guattari (1988) once put it, with respect to the proliferative powers of 
life itself, “the enemy is the organism” (p. 158); see also (Colebrook 2011; Protevi 
2012). There is a considerable overlap between this understanding of organic exist-
ence and the ambitions of synthetic biologists, for whom studied indifference about 
the organism is a founding assumption and to such extent that Calvert reports on 
their speaking of “organism agnosticism” (Calvert, in draft; Johnson 2010). In sum, 
the diverse understandings of life, time, and the organism on which these divergent 
historical and philosophical perspectives rest mean that no temporal frame can be 
taken for granted, making the genealogical urge to question the nature of the present 
seem particularly well suited (Dean 1994; Hoy 2008).
Finally, our paper could also be regarded as contributing to ongoing debates 
regarding the ontological turn within science and technology studies (van Heur et al. 
2012). Firstly, insofar as we attend to the circulation of a common object within a 
divided community and its role in the production of value, we contribute to the liter-
ature on the subject (Dussauge et al. 2015). At the same time, our understanding of 
the relationship between the competing groups is closer to Luc Boltanski and Lau-
rent Thévenot’s (2006) pluralist perspective on social action, and is also indebted 
to Michel Serres’ (2007) connected insight that the work of mutual definition that 
is involved in relational modes of existence creates yet other relationships (Brown 
2002; Guggenheim and Potthast 2012). As a result, our understanding of circulation 
is more open than the literature on material culture and the production of value will 
admit and to the extent that we can imagine how the dynamics we outline might 
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produce temporal registers beyond the three considered here. Secondly, we have 
been asked whether we are discussing plural temporalities or just the many ways in 
which time is cast. Consistently with our turn to Boltanski and Thévenot, our answer 
is that this depends on our readers. If they are committed to the view that only one 
kind of time has persisted throughout cultures and over ages, then we are committed 
to keeping open the possibility that there may be many times. We regard it as the job 
of the ontologist to uncover which is true and which false, though we fear that no 
closure is possible. If, alternatively, our readers are comfortable with the suggestion 
that there may indeed be many kinds of time, then for the purposes of this paper we 
can set ontological assumptions aside and treat the registers in this paper as captur-
ing the different ways in which time can be framed or understood and the effects of 
that framing. As a result of these two sets of considerations, pluralist and pragmatist, 
we embrace the proliferating complexities of the phenomenal world, particularly as 
this relates to contemporary development of science and technology, but also remain 
unpersuaded by the urge to weld the resulting multiplicity together and forge a com-
mon world (Mol 2002; Law 2004, pp. 45–67). We thus find ourselves very sympa-
thetic toward Lynch’s (2013) call to ontography, to “ethnographic investigations of 
particular world-making and world-sustaining practices that do not begin by assum-
ing a general picture of the world” (p. 444). At the same time, we cannot but be 
wary of Lynch’s further call to historical investigation.
We now proceed to articulate these temporal registers in greater detail, aim-
ing ultimately to draw out their complex, mutually constitutive relationship to one 
another.
The Historical Register
It is deceptively easy to characterise the historical register because, on the surface, 
it is the register with which most of us are intuitively familiar. Yet, such familiarity 
might lead too readily to labelling everything that is written of things from the past, 
or informed by an understanding of what came before, as a history. As we shall see 
with the phyletic and molecular, however, there are ways of understanding objects 
of the past in relation to the present that are not necessarily historical. The Norfolk 
Horn helps us to explain.
As the arguments over the preservation of the Norfolk Horn began to take shape, 
Ark acknowledged its debt to Frank Rayns, former director of the Norfolk Agricul-
tural Station, by reprinting Rayns’ history of the breed, which had been first pub-
lished some years earlier, in the Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society of Eng-
land (Rayns 1975).
Rayns’ central claim was that the Norfolk Horn’s disappearance was important 
to any understanding of the British agricultural revolution, the transformation of the 
agricultural economy and related modes of production that unfolded over the course 
of the 18th and 19th centuries (Overton 1996). Prior to the late 18th century, when 
the term “Norfolks” was first employed, there were no precise descriptions of the 
many sheep that sustained the mixed farming economy of East Anglia. When these 
same sheep eventually came to the attention of some of the most famous agricultural 
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improvers of the period, their connotations were overwhelmingly negative. Thus, in 
1808, Thomas Coke reminded local dignitaries of their duty to “eradicat[e] the Nor-
folk breed of sheep, the most worthless race of animals that ever existed” (Wade-
Martins 1993, pp. 34–35). No lesser figures than Arthur Young, William Marshall 
and David Low, leading agricultural writers of the day, took note of the transforma-
tion in which these sheep were caught up, and, as early as in 1842, Low was per-
suaded that they were destined for extinction. He wrote:
While [the Norfolk] might still have retained its property of hardiness and 
robustness, the too great length of the limbs, the flatness and lankness of the 
body, and, with the change of external form, the too great wildness of tem-
per, might have been corrected, as is the case of every other race of Sheep to 
which the care of the breeder has been directed. But few breeders appear to 
have thought the Norfolk so deserving of preservation and improvement, as 
to have deemed it necessary to apply to it those principles of breeding which 
have been successfully applied to other races. Very lately, indeed, the matter 
has occupied the attention of the possessors of the few unmixed flocks which 
remain; but unless these gentlemen are seconded by more extensive support 
than they have yet received, it is believed that this ancient race will, at no dis-
tant time, be merged in others which have acquired a higher value by the care 
of the breeder (Wade-Martins 1993, pp. 63–64).
Leading historical accounts of the period corroborate this understanding. In a clas-
sic analysis of Victorian society, Ritvo (1987) observes how an animal came to be 
regarded as good only insofar as it took to its place in the environmental landscape 
in a way that exemplified God’s intended ordering of nature. The most noble were 
those animals domesticated and bred to directly serve human purposes. On this 
understanding, the Norfolk sheep were failures many times over, first as one of those 
old strains developed as a result of random mating and the accidents of time and 
place, second thanks to their wild temper and liability to jump over the quintessen-
tial symbol of agricultural improvement, the enclosing wall, and third, because the 
landscape to which one might have thought they fitted most perfectly was actually 
being enclosed all around them. What was desired was a wholly different sheep. 
Southdown and Leicester sheep were crossed with the native sheep of Norfolk, 
eventually resulting in the creation of the Suffolk and its correlative association of 
farmers and breeders, the Suffolk Sheep Society. While the Suffolk was the desired 
end of agricultural improvement in East Anglia, the “Norfolk Horn” also emerges as 
a result of this process, but not so much as a distinct breed, rather as an unclaimed 
population much more akin to a landrace, and valued primarily for its role in the 
creation and perpetuation of the Suffolk.
In sum, according to the terms the historical register sets, if anything like a Nor-
folk Horn exists today, it does so as a testament to the culture of improvement, but 
also as an artefact very much out of time. One wonders about the extent to which the 
insistence on the continued existence of something whose context has so demon-
strably disappeared can be regarded as anything other than romantic attachment, but 
the tension has long bedevilled the relationship between history and heritage, and, if 
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anything, this situation calls for some consideration of what may be distinctive about 
“bio-heritage” (Lowenthal 1998, 2005).
The Phyletic Register
In its historical framing, the Norfolk Horn, a neglected, chastised, and accidentally 
engendered breed eventually became extinct, and all that remains are memories, 
material and immaterial. This understanding, however, runs counter to an alternative 
temporal configuration of the Norfolk Horn, the phyletic register. This is the mode 
of reasoning about the temporal configuration of organisms that Ritvo (1987) takes 
as her object of study, but which can also be considered more symmetrically than 
the historian is want to, or can do.
The first thing to note about the historical register is that an important tension 
runs through its framing of the Norfolk Horn. On the one hand, it regards the Nor-
folk Horn as something like a gift of nature, so much so that it was long regarded as 
“formed more like deer than sheep… deer-like sheep” (Culley 1786, p. 121). On the 
other hand, it also regards the loss of the Norfolk Horn as the inevitable price the 
progress of agriculture has exacted. The historical register, in other words, presumes 
an original object of care that is lost in the passage of time. Within the phyletic 
register, however, this relationship to the passage of time makes little sense because 
what makes sheep what they are is not some essential feature, imprinted at their 
origin, but their line of descent. Organisms are constantly undergoing change and 
transformation, be it through the vagaries of reproduction or through farmers’ and 
breeders’ studied interventions, be they in the form of selective culling or selective 
mating. The extent to which the Norfolk Horn ever existed was therefore only the 
extent to which these farmers and breeders agreed that a given flock conformed to 
the standards of the day, eventually institutionalized by breed societies (Ritvo 1987; 
Woods 2013, 2017). As an adjectival qualification, phyletic signals this distinctive 
social and cultural investment in understanding the relationship between present and 
temporally removed sheep in terms of a lineage, or a phylum (Franklin 2007; Strath-
ern 1992).
On the terms that the phyletic register sets, preservation is a matter of negotiating 
the features which make for a true Norfolk Horn and the survival of enough sheep to 
maintain a healthy population. Here is where extinction emerges as an issue within 
the phyletic register. Not enough breeders found a way to make the maintenance 
of the Norfolk Horn pay. Once really valuable sheep such as the Suffolk were well 
established, these breeders no longer cared to keep any flocks of Norfolk Horn and 
so the breed died out.
In sum, within the phyletic register, extinction is a matter of consensus between 
breeders. If we were to abide only by the social and cultural practices that constitute 
animal breeding, the proposition that the Norfolk Horn was extinguished would be 
near impossible to avoid. The only way to prevent all breeders from agreeing with 
this proposition is to appeal to a third temporal register, the molecular. As we shall 
see, the molecular could not be more different from the phyletic. Later we explain 
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how nevertheless making the molecular appear compatible with the phyletic is all 
part of the value making that temporal registers achieve.
The Molecular Register
The RBST eventually agreed that there was no need to distinguish between old and 
new representatives of the Norfolk Horn, nevertheless, as we have seen, doubts con-
tinue to be voiced to this day. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the historian Peter Wade-Mar-
tins is one such skeptic. He writes:
We have lost “the great length of the limbs, the flatness and lankness of the 
body” and “the great wildness of temper” so aptly described by David Low 
in his Domesticated Animals of Great Britain published in 1842. The docile 
nature and conformation of the present-day breed carries many of the char-
acteristics of the placid Suffolk, which in turn derives its docility from the 
Southdown. The modern Norfolk is not the agile “deer-like” animal early writ-
ers frequently described. … Today’s Norfolk is, however, the closest we can 
now come to the genes of this once primitive breed (Wade-Martins 1993, pp. 
172–173).
Strikingly, this historical and nostalgic evocation of the Norfolk Horn closes by 
referring not to the sheep themselves, but to genes. This is the stuff of the molecular 
register.
In the potted history with which we began, as the number of Norfolk Horn plum-
meted down to a single flock, it found a home in the Animal Research Station (ARS) 
at the University of Cambridge, as the object of studies into the inheritance of an 
organic disorder that was understood to characterize inbred livestock. This claim 
is particularly important for differentiating the phyletic and molecular temporal 
registers.
In the course of the debates over the Norfolk Horn, Ark reprinted a report first 
published thirty years earlier (Ark 1984). This report could be read as suggesting 
that the interest in the breed within the ARS revolved primarily around the failure of 
testicles to descend and its impact on the reproduction of the flocks to which a ram 
was put. As such, we could conclude that a phyletic perspective framed the ARS’s 
investment in housing the Norfolk Horn. From a molecular perspective, however, 
the important point is that the continued transmission of the trait from one gen-
eration to the next illustrated the failure to appreciate how organisms are genetic 
composites that are easily undone by careless practice, witness the precarious state 
of the flock that the ARS housed. As Peter Jewell (1993) observed in the foreword 
to Wade-Martins’ history: “It is alarming to know how close [the Norfolk Horns] 
came to extinction, but also exasperating to learn how often they were nearly saved 
intact. … John Hammond [Director of the ARS] … failed to appreciate their breed-
ing plight. In truth, he was probably more interested in their prevalent condition in 
which the rams had only one descended testicle, than in the survival of the breed” 
(xv). Extinction was only averted once the RBST transformed local understanding 
of the Norfolk Horn’s cryptorchidism into a symptom of inbreeding, replacing the 
234 D. J. Berry, P. Palladino 
1 3
practice with a balanced programme of inbreeding and outbreeding. This, so it goes, 
eventually enabled the RBST to revive a lineage and improve the commercial posi-
tion of the Norfolk Horn, by re-establishing the breed and to a level of purity above 
the usual standards.
As Alastair Dymond put it just prior to the official agreement that there was no 
difference between the old and new Norfolk Horn, the recovery was a business of 
reshuffling genes to match the desires of the day: “This was not the reconstruction 
of a breed but the consolidation of existing genes to enable the breed in the future to 
claim “pure” status or certainly as pure as many of the “pedigree” breeds in exist-
ence today” (Dymond 1982, p. 7). The temporal frame here is not oriented toward 
either the past or any lines of descent, but to the future, to the recombinatory space 
of possibilities opened up by crossing different breeds. One might even propose that 
the molecular register jettisons all attachment to the past, except perhaps that the 
value of bringing the Norfolk Horn back from extinction stems from the past.
Time and the Creation of Value
As we noted at the outset, the three temporal registers depend on one another and 
such dependence is key to the creation of value. We now draw out the full complex-
ity of such relations.
It goes without saying that the extinction of the Norfolk Horn and investment 
in its contemporary copy are central to the historical temporal register, so driv-
ing the enterprises of reconstruction.8 The phyletic register emphasizes, however, 
how all populations are forever undergoing change. If sheep are artefacts exhibiting 
a breeder’s selective prowess in the face of change, then the Norfolk Horn should 
emphatically have gone extinct. That was the correct order of things. At the same 
time, despite their differences, the phyletic register also depends upon the existence 
of something like the historical Norfolk Horn. To a farmer tending to flocks of a 
similar size and carrying out similar daily tasks with respect to more or less simi-
lar organisms, there is little practical difference between them all, but, occasionally, 
some are regarded as more valuable than others. On this particular occasion, the 
reason to invest in one population of sheep rather than another was the history of 
the Norfolk Horn. In sum, the maintenance of breeds such as the Norfolk Horn, an 
activity composed in the phyletic register, is justified by and at the same time antag-
onistic to the historical register.
In a similar fashion, the molecular register owes its resonance to the historical 
register because, as Wade-Martins has it, genes are witnesses to processes of histori-
cal transformation and so they also are key to the recovery of that which was thought 
lost. Again, however, the molecular is simultaneously antithetical to the historical 
register because the passage of time leaves the genes themselves unaffected. If so 
desired, all the meanings and values attached to the Norfolk Horn in the historical 
8 Franklin (2007) traces how such historical investment is translated into the economic value attached to 
transgenic reproduction.
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register can be brushed aside. Equally, the molecular register is produced in part 
by the phyletic because genes are shuttled around in organisms whose taxonomic 
grouping and genealogical ordering were important to deciding what crosses were 
most desirable to recover the Norfolk Horn, and yet it also is antithetical because the 
genes required could have been obtained with equal ease from sources that the phyl-
etic framing of the organism would rule out.
Importantly, the relationship between these temporal configurations is not only 
conceptual, but also rooted socially and economically. Firstly, Walling’s under-
standing of the contemporary Norfolk Horn as a “simulacrum” points to a well-
established notion of the copy as derivative and inferior to the original, and thus 
to the transformation of the lost original into a highly desirable object. Secondly, 
if breeders once exterminated the Norfolk Horn because they were of no economic 
value, breeders and geneticists today work in the image of historical reconstruction, 
increasing differentiation between all animals that already exist and providing means 
for new economic valuations, including the importance attached today to heritage 
breeds (Yarwood and Evans 2006; Colombino and Giaccaria 2015). Thirdly, from 
the geneticist’s perspective, the phyletic register leaves open and indeterminate how 
best to shape the response to the new economic opportunities just mentioned. For 
example, Sheppy (1979), as a commercial breeder, insisted on the importance of out-
breeding with distantly related breeds because only such distance would enable the 
breeder to visualize the manifold and not always predictable effects of the crosses 
undertaken. As the trained geneticist, Alderson (1982) sought to narrow the scope 
for judgment and fortune by advancing an understanding of sheep as genetic assem-
blages that were amenable to recomposition by means of the calculated movement 
of rams between different flocks. As such, what also divided Sheppy and Alderson 
were the competing professional priorities and technical capacities of breeders and 
geneticists, as well as the relationship between breed societies and a new generation 
of commercial breeders, steeped in the language of genetic science (Holloway and 
Morris 2012). From the latter’s perspective, anything could be had. If “deer-like” 
agility were desirable and valuable, the appropriate genes could be found to produce 
an even more authentic Norfolk Horn, but at some financial cost. In other words, if, 
as the NHBG and RBST argue, the original Norfolk Horn came extremely close to 
being lost, it has at the same time been almost miraculously preserved, thereby add-
ing maximum economic value to the contemporary representatives of the Norfolk 
Horn. As such, distinctions between geneticists’ and breeders’ practices of improve-
ment as dependent on more or less explicit forms of knowledge, as well as the char-
acterisation of the latter’s “tacit” skills as “traditional,” needs to be treated with cir-
cumspection, because this terminology is not neutral, but the product of the struggle 
between breeders and geneticists for authority and pre-eminence over a shared ago-
nistic field (cf. Holloway and Morris 2012; Boltanski and Thévenot 2006).9
9 In their very helpful analysis of breeders’ and geneticists’ practices, Holloway and Morris (2012) draw 
out their co-constitutive relationship. At the same time, however, they also configure the two assem-
blages as the product of a single governmental formation. From our perspective, this assumption reduces 
the scope for any understanding of the relationship between breeders’ and geneticists’ practices, includ-
ing their temporal configurations of the organism, as open-ended.
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Synthetic Biology and Its Times
We now turn our attention to how the organism, as a material and semiotic 
assemblage, may today be undergoing a further transformation, one which can be 
understood better thanks to the apparatus of temporal registers.
A group of scientists and engineers collected together under the umbrella of 
synthetic biology claim to be transforming biological existence. They some-
times do so in ways that resonate with the molecular register. The pivotal notion 
that organisms can be decomposed and recomposed by attending to DNA and 
its cellular functions, for instance, is no different to Alderson’s understanding of 
breeding and its future. Furthermore, time is equally important to both parties’ 
endeavour to establish the value of their expertise. There is, however, one clear 
difference between what is going on within synthetic biology and the molecular 
register. Synthetic biologists argue that organisms are no longer needed to per-
petuate a lineage because machines can now produce whatever DNA sequence 
is desired, be it a copy of a sequence found in nature or something that has been 
designed to meet human specifications. Perhaps unsurprisingly, leading figures in 
the field have come to regard evolution as a historical process imposed upon bio-
logical form, positioning synthetic biology as liberating the organism from such 
tyranny (Endy 2014).
Frow (2013) summarizes the situation very usefully, pointing to the distinctive 
temporal structure of synthetic biology:
Through practices of isolation, measurement, standardization and reconfigu-
ration, these biological parts become dissociated from their species prov-
enance and evolutionary histories. A key aim of these efforts is to disentan-
gle genetic material from its biological context so as to facilitate the flow of 
genetic information across space, time and organisms, to enable entry into 
new systems of biological production (p. 433).
There are other examples which suggest that synthetic biology is orientated tem-
porally toward the future, again in ways that may match the molecular register 
(Delgado 2016). In this last part of our argument, however, we want to explain 
how synthetic biology, far from escaping the past, combines and mobilises 
diverse temporal registers, to both create value and invite political trouble.
The most renowned example of synthetic biology at work is the transformation 
of a yeast so as to produce a chemical precursor to artemisinic acid, an effec-
tive antimalarial drug that is usually extracted from the plant Artemisia annua. 
Once we are alerted to the operation of temporal registers, a survey of the ways 
in which this enterprise is explained reveals quite readily how shifts between his-
torical, phyletic, and molecular registers serve to establish its value.
Introductions to the enterprise open by informing us that “[the world is] greatly 
indebted to Chinese scientists and traditional healers for their discovery and open 
sharing of the antimalarial properties of [Artemisia annua] …” (Hale et al. 2007, 
p. 198). These acknowledgments then shift from the long history of use to discus-
sions of current, agricultural methods of extracting artemisinin:
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Artemisinin … is currently extracted from dried leaves and inflorescences 
from Artemisia annua, an annual herb that is primarily cultivated through-
out China and Southeast Asia. Artemisia annua is a very labor-intensive 
crop with a lengthy growing cycle; the period from time of planting to 
artemisinin extraction is 12-18 months. In addition, the plant’s artemisinin 
content is quite sensitive to genetic backgrounds, cultivation conditions, 
and harvesting periods…. [It is] clear that there is a need for an additional 
source of artemisinin that is consistent, reliable, pure, and inexpensive … 
(Hale et al. 2007, p. 199).
Having framed the plant in phyletic terms, then comes the molecular move, away 
from the temporalities of history and nature. Diverse and unreliable plants, as well 
as the associated, labor-intensive farming practices, are to be replaced with yeasts 
reconstructed to carry the genes required to produce the desired precursor and then 
grown in vats operated by a small number of highly skilled technicians. One notable 
advocate of synthetic biology describes the operation in the following terms:
[W]hen the project began, gene sequences for artemisinin pathway compo-
nents in wormwood were available electronically, but a key gene was not avail-
able as physical DNA. Therefore, [the] team resorted to adopting a version of 
that gene from another plant, which they identified within a sequence data-
base. The gene was synthesized from scratch and optimized for expression in 
yeast… (Carlson 2010, p. 100).
As Frow would observe, this is part of a much broader view amongst synthetic biol-
ogists that their organisms escape the hold of history and nature because the compo-
nents come from anywhere, including automated synthesizers. These organisms are 
the fruit of human creativity. At the same time, our analysis helps to articulate how 
this enterprise comes to be understood as valuable through its drawing connections 
between diverse temporal registers. Were it not for the long history of the plant, 
which matters not a jot for the effectiveness of the chemical, and for the conditions 
in which the species is to this day maintained and farmed, which matter for reasons 
above and beyond the effectiveness of the chemical, the value of recombinant yeast 
in vats would be considerably smaller.
Importantly, this example also illustrates how and why it matters that these reg-
isters are not just semiotic, but also material assemblages. When the advocates of 
synthetically produced artemisinin sought to clarify the importance of their work 
by referring to the farmers currently cultivating Artemisia, the fact that not one, 
but three material and semiotic assemblages were in play quickly came to the fore. 
Many, in particular the Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration 
(ETC Group), a renowned civil society organisation broadly interested in biotech-
nology and invested particularly in the preservation of cultural diversity and the pro-
motion of environmentally sustainable economies, rushed to the defense of farmers 
whose livelihood was now threatened (ETC Group 2014). Just as with the Norfolk 
Horn, the field is agonistic and the ensuing debate has revolved around which organ-
ism is most important and for whom. As Griesemer has argued in another context, 
concerning the location of the biological level at which reproduction occurs:
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Because Darwinian evolutionary theory is framed in terms of a requirement 
for a capacity or disposition of heritability it leaves open questions of which 
inheritance mechanisms are involved in different instances. Because molecular 
biology is concerned with mechanisms that frequently or generally operate in 
gene regulation and development (though not without interest in variation), it 
leaves open questions of which mechanisms are significant in evolution and 
in what ways. Evolutionary biology is concerned with both the distribution of 
traits (including the presence of mechanisms) among taxa and the dynamical 
role of mechanisms in evolutionary processes of change within and among lin-
eages. Thus, in asking questions about reductionism and relative significance 
of epigenetic phenomena in relation to well-established theories of genetic 
information we have to ask, “reduction for whose purpose(s)?” and “signifi-
cance relative to whose problems?” (Griesemer 2011, p. 38).
Such plurality is likewise a political issue, one that is easier to map by recognizing 
the centrality of care. Indeed, the relationships we have described between the tem-
poral registers and their correlate notions of worth are most illuminating if under-
stood as pivoting around alternative notions of care (Haraway 2008; Shukin 2009). 
The historical register involves caring for organisms that made the world we inhabit, 
but are now lost to us. Care is equally important in the phyletic register, but here it is 
the attention and skill devoted to channelling the fecundity of the organism and con-
verting it into new and desirable commodities, and their maintenance. The molecu-
lar register, on the other hand, evacuates care for the organism beyond investment in 
matching design and future effects. This said, just as we have emphasised that there 
may be many other temporal registers outside of the three highlighted here, there 
may also be many other forms of care that go into the making of synthetic biology.10
Conclusion
We have argued that the making of organisms involves multiple temporal registers. 
We have also characterized the material and semiotic assemblages sustaining three 
such registers and how they are knotted together in the process of creating value. 
We close with three broader conclusions about this exploration of the relationship 
between life, time, and the organism.
The future-orientated, promissory economy of biotechnological enterprises has 
been crucially important to the emergence of the sociology of expectations as sub-
field of sociological inquiry, but this literature has sometimes overlooked how this 
economy is indebted to the interplay of competing, yet mutually dependent regimes 
(see Brown et al. 2000; also Moreira and Palladino 2005). Our argument about the 
multiplicity and interplay of temporal registers not only restates the importance of 
10 At the cost of pressing the parallels between synthetic biology and Deleuzian perspectives on life, 
time, and the organism beyond reasonable limits, it might be useful to consider how an alternative under-
standing of care might be constructed out of responses to Haraway’s criticism that Deleuzian perspec-
tives on non-human animals convey little care for “real” animals (Beaulieu 2011).
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such complexity, but also emphasises how social and cultural analysis of contempo-
rary biology should presume neither historical, phyletic, nor molecular temporali-
ties. Anywhere that we find material and semiotic assemblages they will be bound 
up with a temporal component, one that historians should seek out and empower.
The second conclusion speaks to wider debates about the creation of value in 
that collection of industries sometimes labelled the “bioeconomy”; see (Rajan 
2006; Rose 2007; Cooper 2008; Birch and Tyfield 2013). Time, we have argued, 
is involved centrally in the creation of value, so much so that we might even think 
of the bioeconomy as produced not by freeing life from the hold of time, but by 
reconfiguring relations between life, time, and the organism. The same can be said 
of closely related enterprises to which certain organizations in our story, such as 
the Zoological Society of London, were early contributors, as they began to collect 
representatives of organisms for the purposes of their preservation for future genera-
tions, efforts that eventually came to be understood as securing “biodiversity.” Might 
we not likewise conclude that biodiversity is made by reconfiguring these pivotal 
relations between life, time, and the organism? (van Dooren 2014). We offer these 
two suggestions as ways to immediately identify how the notion of multiple tempo-
ral registers can motivate work on issues of considerable importance today.
Our third and final conclusion concerns the organism and its relationship to the 
contemporary politics of “life itself” (Rose 2007). We hope to have provided a com-
pelling description of much that occurs when people talk about the geneticization 
and molecularization of life. Rather than focusing on scientific discourse, the reor-
ganization of scientific institutions, or the transformation of the marketplace, our 
account has highlighted how the organism is configured within different material 
and semiotic assemblages. Any of these approaches can of course prove revealing, 
but the changing configuration of the organism must remain central to any mean-
ingful history of the present, the task of genealogy. Some will argue that our focus 
on the organism risks ignoring the novelty of recent interventions which have left 
the organism behind. Rather than asserting the primacy of one temporality over any 
other, our approach turns the proverbial tables upon claims to novelty, allowing us 
to see how they are involved in the construction of one among a number of different 
temporal registers, each dependent on the others. What this reaffirms is the central-
ity of relations between life, time, and the organism, each of which only becomes 
intelligible in relation to the others. Our conclusions then are made for the pre-
sent, and historical research in an unreflexive mode would undo parts of our argu-
ment. The only reason that we hesitated earlier, pausing before joining Lynch’s call 
to ontography, was to first have some greater clarity about how time works within 
historiographical practice.11 Nevertheless with the notion of temporal registers as 
a guide, and an appreciation for their ubiquity in the hands of widely divergent per-
sons, be they venture capitalists, historians, philosophers, or sociologists, we can 
make the past less a rhetorical device and more an essential analytical resource for 
11 The complicated relationship between ethnographic and historical modes of inquiry is discussed use-
fully in Ingold (2011). Like Crang, Ingold seeks to articulate a response by turning to Deleuze and Henri 
Bergson.
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any understanding of the contemporary reconfigurations of the organism and the 
evolving politics of life itself.
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